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The Impact of the UK New Deal for Lone Parents on Benefit Receipt
* 
 
This paper evaluates the UK New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) program, which aims to 
return lone parents to work. Using rich administrative data on benefit receipt histories and a 
“selection on observed variables” identification strategy, we find that the program modestly 
reduces benefit receipt among participants. Methodologically, we highlight the importance of 
flexibly conditioning on benefit histories, as well as taking account of complex sample 
designs when applying matching methods. We find that survey measures of attitudes add 
information beyond that contained in the benefit histories and that incorporating the insights 
of the recent literature on dynamic treatment effects matters even when not formally applying 
the related methods. Finally, we explain why our results differ substantially from those of the 
official evaluation of NDLP, which found very large impacts on benefit exits. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we evaluate the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), a large voluntary program for single 
parents in the United Kingdom (UK). This program, part of a family of welfare-to-work programs 
introduced by Britain’s “New Labour” government in the late 1990s, provides information, referrals and 
limited financial support to “encourage lone parents to improve their prospects and living standards by 
taking up and increasing paid work, and to improve their job readiness to increase their employment 
opportunities” (UK Department for Work and Pensions 2002). Its features resemble those of earlier 
voluntary programs targeted at a similar population in the United States (US), as well as the less intensive 
aspects of general employment and training programs such as the US Workforce Investment Act or the 
Canadian federal-provincial Labor Market Development Agreements. As such, both our methodological and 
our substantive findings have relevance inside and outside the UK. 
  Our evaluation applies semi-parametric matching methods to a large administrative dataset rich in 
lagged outcome measures. Our decision to rely on matching methods has a fourfold motivation: first, the 
literature clearly indicates the importance of conditioning on lagged outcome variables for reducing (and, 
hopefully, eliminating) selection bias; we have exceptionally detailed data on these variables. Second, using 
a subset of our data for which we have detailed survey information, we can examine the value of 
conditioning on additional variables not present in the administrative data, including a variety of attitudinal 
measures. Third, relative to conventional analysis that also assumes selection on observed variables but 
estimates a parametric linear model with main effects in the conditioning variables, matching does not 
impose linearity on the conditional mean function and allows examination of the extent of common support 
(i.e. overlap).  Fourth, we lack access to plausible exclusion restrictions due to the design and 
implementation of the NDLP program. While the presence or absence of an instrument does not affect the 
plausibility of our “selection on observed variables” assumption, it does reduce the choice set of available 
evaluation strategies.   
  We examine the impact of NDLP participation on individuals eligible for NDLP in August 2000 who 
began a spell of NDLP participation between August 1, 2000 and April 28, 2001 using weekly benefit 
receipt as an outcome measure. Our empirical analysis yields a number of important substantive and 
methodological findings. On the substantive side, we estimate large (by the standards of experimental 
evaluations of similar programs in the US) and fairly persistent effects of NDLP participation on the 
probability of benefit receipt. For NDLP participants in the midst of long spells (at least 66 weeks) of receipt 
of Income Support (IS), a group we call “the stock”, we estimate a reduction in the probability of being on   3 
IS of 17.48 percentage points. In contrast, we estimate that NDLP participants in the midst of relatively 
short spells of IS receipt, whom we call “the flow”, experience a reduction in the probability of being on IS 
of 5.21 percentage points. The difference between the stock and flow estimates suggests a huge one time 
benefit from encouraging long-term IS recipients to look for work at a time when other program changes 
made it more financially attractive for them to do so. The difference also likely reflects the fact that our data 
allow us to do a better job of controlling for selection in the flow than in the stock. 
  Though surprisingly large, our estimates are much smaller than those of the official impact evaluation 
commissioned by the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), conducted by the National Centre for 
Social Research (NCSR) and reported in Lessof et al. (2003).  We explore the sources of these differences. 
  Methodologically, our analyses support the general conclusion in the literature regarding the 
importance of pre-program outcome measures in reducing selection bias in non-experimental studies.  
Moreover, we show, building on Card and Sullivan (1988), Heckman et al. (1998a) and Heckman and Smith 
(1999), the importance of not just conditioning on lagged outcomes but of doing so flexibly.  Conditioning 
on simple summary measures of time on benefit prior to August 2000 yields different, and larger, impact 
estimates than our preferred measures that embody the rich heterogeneity in IS participation histories 
present in the data.  Our results suggest that  the literature has  devoted insufficient attention to the 
importance of flexibility when conditioning on past outcomes. 
  Using survey data from the official evaluation for a subset of our sample, we show that, once we 
condition flexibly on lagged outcomes, further conditioning on a variety of measures of attitudes towards 
work has a large effect on the impact estimates. This indicates that the lagged outcomes we employ do not 
fully embody these otherwise unobserved factors. These findings suggest the value of further exploring the 
importance of such variables in other contexts and cast some doubt on the now popular strategy of relying 
on administrative data alone to evaluate active labor market programs. In a parallel analysis, we find that 
matched exogenous local area economic variables from the Labour Force Survey do not change the 
estimates once we flexibly account for the history of IS receipt. This raises questions about the 
generalizability of Heckman et al.’s (1998a) finding on the importance of conditioning finely on local labor 
markets. 
  Our final methodological finding concerns the use of propensity score matching in stratified samples.  
We find that taking account of the stratification by applying propensity score matching within strata, as 
suggested by Dolton et al. (2006), rather than ignoring the problem (as in the rest of the literature) makes a 
difference to our estimates.   4 
  The remainder of our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the NDLP program and 
policy context and Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 outlines our econometric framework.  Section 5 
presents our main results using the full sample while Section 6 presents analyses for subgroups as well as 
some secondary analyses.  Section 7 compares our estimates to those in the literature.  Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. The NDLP Program and Policy Context 
2.1 Program basics 
The New Deal for Lone Parents is a voluntary program that aims to help lone parents get jobs or increase 
their hours of work, either directly or by increasing their employability.  In its early stages (including the 
period covered by our data) the NDLP offered participants advice and assistance (in applying for jobs and 
training courses) and support (in claiming benefits) from a Personal Advisor (PA). The PA also conducted 
an in-work benefit calculation with the participant, to highlight the potential financial benefits of returning 
to work or working more. NDLP personal advisors can also approve financial assistance to help with travel 
costs to attend job interviews, childcare costs or fees for training courses recommended by the PA. Other 
than these small amounts, NDLP does not provide participants with additional benefits beyond those for 
which they already qualified.   
  In the context of this evaluation, the NDLP “treatment” has three important characteristics. The first is 
heterogeneity resulting from variation among caseworkers in terms of service recommendations and 
generosity with subsidies, as well as geographic and temporal variation in the extent of available childcare 
providers and training opportunities. This heterogeneity suggests the potential importance of subgroup 
differences in mean impacts.
1
  The voluntary nature of NDLP represents its second important characteristic.  Simple economic 
reasoning suggests that voluntary programs will have larger mean impacts than mandatory ones , due to 
non-random selection into voluntary programs based on expected impacts. This matters in comparing mean 
impact estimates from NDLP to those from mandatory welfare-to-work programs. 
 
  The relatively low intensity and expense of the services offered constitutes the third important 
characteristic. Over the period of our data, in round figures, there were approximately 100,000 participants 
                                                 
1 As documented in Dolton et al. (2006) this heterogeneity in the treatment, combined with variability in labor 
market outcomes in response to treatment, yields widely varying durations of participation in NDLP. In particular, 
our participants exhibit a highly skewed distribution of durations with a mean of about 39 weeks and long right 
tail stretching out over 100 weeks.  As they discuss in detail, important issues of measurement error and 
interpretation arise when considering these durations; for this reason, we do not attempt any sort of dose-response 
analysis in this study.   5 
and the total program costs were around £40.9 million (at 2000 prices) giving a per unit cost of around £400 
per participant. This level of expenditures suggests relatively modest mean impacts; while the literature 
contains a number of examples of expensive programs with small mean impacts, it contains few examples of 
inexpensive programs with large mean impacts. See Heckman et al. (1999) for a review of the literature on 
evaluating active labor market policies and Card et al. (2010) for a meta-analysis of recent evaluations. 
 
2.2 Policy environment 
In the period we study, lone parents in the UK received means-tested income support (IS) payments that 
depended on how many school-age children they had and on the amount of other income they received as 
well as the standard child benefit received by all UK parents. Lone parents could also receive means-tested 
housing benefits, either in the form of subsidized council housing operated by local governments or 
assistance with rent in the private housing market, as well as assistance with their local council taxes. If they 
worked, lone parents received an earnings subsidy via the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), a program 
similar in nature to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US. Their precise financial circumstances 
depended most crucially on their income from paid work and their housing costs. Access to childcare and its 
price varied (and still do vary) enormously by geographical location across the UK, especially for children 
under age four, as did access to state funded nursery school and kindergarten. Specifically the scene 
changed in 1999 with the first round of the Sure Start national policy which provided integrated learning and 
childcare for most disadvantaged areas as well as parenting guidance and antenatal and postnatal care. 
Gregg and Harkness (2003), Gregg, et al.  (2009) and Suhrcke et al (2009) provide further information 
regarding these policies and programs and the wider impact of the NDLP program. 
  Prior to the advent of NDLP only limited pressure was put on lone parents to work in the UK.  IS 
recipients had to participate in semi-annual “Restart” interviews  – see e.g. Dolton and O’Neill (2002) for 
details and evaluation results – but, particularly in comparison with the long history of welfare-to-work 
programs in the United States, social and programmatic expectations, as well as financial incentives, helped 
keep lone parents in the UK at home. 
  Perhaps not surprisingly, this policy environment led lone mothers to have much lower employment 
rates than married mothers. Figure 2 of Gregg and Harkness (2003), drawn from OECD (2001), shows an 
“employment gap” of 24 percentage points in the UK in 1999. In contrast, in most other OECD countries 
single mothers were more likely to work than married mothers.  For example, at the other extreme, in Italy 
and Spain in 1999 single mothers had employment rates 27 and 23 percentage points higher than married   6 
mothers, respectively. This large difference provided part of the motivation for the introduction of the 
NDLP. 
  As described in, e.g., Gregg and Harkness (2003), around the same time as the nationwide introduction 
of NDLP in 1998 four  other important labour market changes occurred. First, the Working Family Tax 
Credit (WFTC) replaced the pre-existing Family Credit (FC). This resulted, in general, in more generous 
support for working lone parents both directly in terms of larger credits and indirectly via the handling of 
childcare expenses. Second, a National Minimum Wage was introduced in 1999.  Dolton et al. (2010) find 
that  the minimum wage  had little effect on employment but a significant positive impact in reducing wage 
inequality. Third, the UK reorganized its system of employment and training programs in the form of the 
Job Centre Plus system. This system includes case management, “one stop” centers, performance standards 
and all the rest of the currently popular design features for these schemes. Finally , in the period after our 
data, lone parents became subject to mandatory Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) both at the start of their IS 
spells and at regular intervals thereafter.  For more on WFIs and their interaction with NDLP see Coleman, 
et al. (2003) and Knight et al. (2006). 
  The policy environment as described here has three main implications for our study.  First, the relative 
lack of programs to push lone parents on IS into work prior to NDLP suggests that many among the stock of 
NDLP participants in place at the time of NDLP introduction may have needed only a gentle nudge to move 
them into work.  Second, the program changes helped to make work more attractive relative to IS receipt; 
when the PA calculated the costs and benefits of work, work may have appeared a more attractive option.  
Third, the new Job Centre Plus system has a stronger focus on employment than earlier UK schemes; part of 
the estimated mean impact of NDLP likely results from referrals to this improved system.  
 
2.3 Evolution of NDLP over time 
An understanding of the development of NDLP over time aids in generalizing the results from this study to 
more recent cohorts of NDLP participants. In Phase One, a prototype was launched in July and August 1997 
in eight locations; see Hales et al. (2000) for an evaluation. In April 1998, Phase Two introduced the 
program nationally for new and repeat claimants. In Phase Three, NDLP became available to the entire 
stock of lone parents in September 1999.  Our study focuses on the Phase Three period. 
  NDLP has greatly expanded its target population over time. Initially, NDLP was rolled out to lone 
parents making new claims for IS whose youngest child was over five years and three months of age. By 
September 1999 the roll out included those lone parents with a youngest child over five years and three   7 
months of age who had initiated an IS claim prior to April 1998 (i.e. the stock of existing claimants). In 
April 2000, the target group was extended to include lone parents with youngest children between the ages 
three and five years three months.  Subsequently, the distinction between the target and non-target group has 
largely disappeared. In November 2001 (not long after our participants joined the NDLP program), all lone 
parents not in work, or working fewer than 16 hours a week, including those not receiving benefits, became 
eligible for NDLP. 
  The NLDP administrative database shows that 577,720 spells of NDLP participation started between 
October 1998 and December 2003 (which includes a small number of repeat spells).  The number of current 
participants has increased over the life of the program, with noticeable increases in September 1999 when 
the stock became eligible and again in response to the widening of eligibility in November 2001.   By the 
end of 2003, participation had reached about 100,000 lone parents.  These figures demonstrate the 
importance of NDLP for lone parents on benefit and suggest that it may have equilibrium implications, an 
issue we return to later. 
 
3. Sample Design, Sampling Issues and Data 
3.1 The sample design 
Our analysis employs a stratified, geographically clustered random sample of 64,973 lone parents on IS and 
eligible for NDLP as of August 2000 sampled in two waves denoted “Wave 1” and “Wave 2” combined 
with a “booster” sample of eligible new lone parent IS cases drawn from the same areas in October 2000. 
The sampling scheme excluded a number of geographic areas involved in pilots of NDLP or other programs 
at the same time. The sampling process also excluded a small number of individuals who had participated in 
NDLP prior to the sampling. The stratification depends on the age of the youngest child and the length of 
the parent’s spell of IS receipt as of the sampling date.
2
  Table 1 shows the composition of the sample relative to the population in the selected Primary 
Sampling Units (PSUs), following exclusion of lone parents who had already participated in NDLP.  Each 
row corresponds to one of the 24 strata defined by the age of the youngest child and the duration of the IS 
spell in progress at the time of sampling.  Columns 4 and 5 give the size of the population for the strata in 
 Administrative data on IS recipients define the 
population. 
                                                 
2 This sample also forms the starting point for the much smaller sample employed in the Lessof et al. (2003) impact report; see 
Section 7.1.  See Dolton et al. (2006) for more details about the definitions of the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), the exclusion 
of certain PSUs, and other sampling issues. 
   8 
August 2000 (labeled “Wave 1/2”) and in October 2000, (the “booster sample”) where the October 
population of interest consists only of lone parents with IS spells of less than three months duration. Column 
6 gives the sum of columns 4 and 5.  The next three columns indicate the number of NDLP participants in 
our sample from Waves 1 and 2 and from the booster sample, and the total of these.  The next four columns 
indicate the overall number of sample members in each stratum from the August 2000 sample and the 
booster sample, the sum of these, and the ratio of the sample to the population.  The final column makes it 
clear that stratification represents an important issue in our data, as the sampling rates range from a low of 
0.19 to a high of 0.99 among the strata, where the highest sampling rate relates to those eligible with spells 
of between 3 and 6 months duration. 
  Spells in progress at a point in time over-represent long spells relative to their representation in the 
population of all spells. The literature calls this “length bias”. We have a length biased population and, as a 
result, a length-biased sample. Adding IS spells of less than three months in progress in October 2000 to our 
population does not convert our population into the population of all spells, rather it undoes the length bias 
in a crude way and to an unknown extent. Rather than attempting elaborate weighting schemes to obtain 
estimates for a random sample of all spells, schemes which would have to rely on assumptions about inflow 
onto IS in periods not in our data, we simply define our population of interest as lone parents eligible for 
NDLP in August 2000 or, for spells of less than three months in duration, in August or October 2000, in the 
PSUs employed in Lessof et al. (2003). The somewhat unusual population of interest is unfortunate, but the 
data essentially force it upon us. We attempt to cope with the length-bias issue by presenting separate 
estimates by length of IS spell in Section 5.2 below. In addition, unless explicitly noted, all of the full 
sample analyses presented use weights to undo the stratified sampling, so that they correspond to estimates 
for the population just defined. 
 
3.2 The data 
Our dataset combines extracts from a number of administrative datasets maintained by the UK government 
for the purpose of administering its benefit programs and active labor market policies. Dolton et al. (2006) 
describes these data sets in some detail.  Like most administrative datasets – see, e.g. the discussions in Hotz 
and Scholz (2002) or Røed and Raaum (2003) – ours had its share of anomalies and problems, including, 
but not limited to, overlapping spells on mutually exclusive benefit programs for a number of individuals. 
As described in Dolton et al. (2006), working in consultation with DWP staff, we spent a substantial amount 
of time and effort on data cleaning in order to produce the data set ultimately used for this paper. Our   9 
analysis file includes complete data on receipt of IS, Incapacity Benefit (IB – disability insurance) and Job 
Seekers Analysis (JSA – the analogue of unemployment insurance in the US) from June 28, 1999 to the 
week of August 26, 2004.  For spells in progress on June 28, 1999, we know the starting date of the spell 
except for spells starting prior to September 1, 1990. We have no information on spells that both start and 
end prior to June 28, 1999.  
 
3.3 Defining the NDLP treatment 
We define participation (or treatment – we use the two terms synonymously) as having an initial NDLP 
interview during the participation window from August 1, 2000 to April 28, 2001.  This is the same 
definition employed in Lessof et al. (2003a).  Our definition of participation differs from the official 
definition of the NDLP caseload, and from some of the other evaluation studies, such as Evans et al. (2002; 
p. 29), which employ a more stringent definition that requires involvement in NDLP beyond an initial                                        
interview.  Similarly, we define as non-participants all lone parents in the sample who do not participate in 
an initial interview during the participation window described above.  Thus, we define participation fairly 
broadly, so as not to miss any possible impacts of NDLP and, as a consequence, define non-participation 
relatively narrowly. 
  Defining participation as we do implicitly puts aside the issues raised in the recent literature on 
dynamic treatment effects – see e.g. Ichimura and Todd (1999), Abbring and van den Berg (2004), Sianesi 
(2004), and Heckman and Navarro (2007) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008).  That literature addresses 
the fact that, contrary to the simple model of a program available in just one period that underlies, e.g., 
Heckman and Robb (1985) and Heckman et al. (1999), individuals in contexts such as that of the NDLP in 
fact have a dynamic choice to make.  In the period covered by our data, they can participate at any time 
during their spell of benefit receipt, or not at all.  By defining participation in terms of a wide but finite 
window of time, we ignore both variation in the timing of participation within the participation window as 
well as future participation by our non-participants after the window and repeat participation by both 
groups.  We discuss the implications of failing to address the dynamic issue for our estimation method and 
for the interpretation of our results later in the paper.   
  Dolton et al. (2006) examine the fraction of non-participants (as defined above) during the 
participation window participating in NDLP following the close of the window.  They find a participation 
rate that starts at zero, climbs to about three percent, and then appears to stabilize.  Of our non-participants, 
about 12 percent participate in NDLP at some point over the period from the close of the participation   10 
window to the end of our data.  Turning to repeat participation, about 25 percent of the lone parents we 
define as NDLP participants have multiple spells of NDLP participation during the period covered by our 
data.  Differences in the incidence of these later spells between participants and non-participants as we 
define them constitute part of the causal effect of the initial participation.  See Dolton et al. (2006) for more 
about these issues. 
 
3.4 Defining the outcome measure 
Our outcome measure of interest consists of benefit receipt.  This outcome measure has two important 
features. First, we care about it for policy reasons; NDLP aims to move lone parents from benefit receipt to 
work. Second, we can construct it from our data, which do not include information on employment or 
earnings. As we define it here, benefit receipt means receiving any one of IS, JSA, or IB.  By using a broad 
benefit receipt measure, we come closer to one minus an employment indicator; but we do not get all the 
way there because some individuals go off benefit without obtaining work (for example, as when they marry 
someone whose income makes them ineligible). 
  Looking at benefit receipt rates over time rather than at variables related to exit from the current spell 
of IS receipt has several advantages. First, our approach takes into account the fact that some NDLP 
participants may leave IS for a time and then return to IS if they lose their job or find that they cannot 
effectively combine it with their family responsibilities. In contrast, outcome measures that look at lengths 
of spells of IS receipt in progress at the time of NDLP participation or of sampling explicitly ignore possible 
future spells, as do the life tables in the Lessof et al. (2003) report. Outcome measures such as whether an 
individual ever left IS within a particular time frame also ignore the potential for return to IS. In addition, 
both types of measures miss any treatment effect that NDLP might have on the duration of future spells of 
employment or non-employment as in Ham and LaLonde (1996) and Eberwein, et al. ) (1997).   
  Outcome measures that focus only on behavior in the first six months after participation allow too 
little time for some of those who stop receiving  benefits to resume doing so and for individuals who do not 
participate in NDLP, to find work on their own.  As a result, such measures may substantially overstate the 
impact of NDLP on benefit receipt in the medium and long run. 
  Our outcome measure consists of benefit receipt measured on a weekly basis; this measure reflects an 
aggregation of the underlying daily data.  As described in Dolton et al. (2006), the variation at the daily 
level appears less reliable than at the weekly level; moreover, program administration proceeds in terms of 
weeks rather than days.  In all of our analyses, we separately estimate weekly impacts in all weeks for all 24   11 
strata.  In reporting overall impact estimates, we take the average of the weekly estimates in what we call the 
“post-program period”, which runs from August 1, 2000 to the week starting August 26, 2004; for 




We adopt the standard “potential outcomes” evaluation framework.  In the usual notation, let  1 Y  denote the 
treated outcome (that realized given participation in NDLP during the participation window) and  0 Y  denote 
the untreated outcome (that realized in the absence of participation in NDLP during the participation 
window).  Let D indicate participation, with  1 D =  for NDLP participants and  0 D = for non-participants.  
We focus on the Average impact of Treatment on the Treated (ATT), given by  
10 1 0 ( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1) TT EY Y D EY D EY D ∆= − == =− =, 
as our parameter of interest.  When combined with data on average costs and an estimate of the marginal 
deadweight cost of taxation,  TT ∆  allows us to determine whether, from the standpoint of economic 
efficiency, the NDLP program should be cut or retained. See e.g. Heckman, et al. (1997b) and Djebbari and 
Smith (2008) for discussions of other parameters of interest in an evaluation context. 
  Because we include individuals who participate after the participation window within our “untreated” 
comparison group, the counterfactual we estimate implicitly includes possible future participation in NDLP. 
This affects the interpretation of our impact estimates and complicates their use in a cost-benefit analysis. In 
particular, it means that our parameter combines, in a loose sense, impacts from participating versus not 
with, for some individuals, impacts from participating now rather than later. 
  Finally, we conduct a partial equilibrium evaluation in this paper. Put differently, we assume the 
absence of any effects of NDLP participation on non-participants. The statistics literature calls this the 
“Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption” or SUTVA for short. As noted in Section 2.3, the NDLP 
program has a large enough footprint on the labor market that we might expect equilibrium effects. In 
particular, we might expect displacement of non-participants by participants; this would cause the non-
participants in our evaluation to experience worse labor market outcomes (in particular, less work and more 
time on benefit) than in the absence of NDLP. This, in turn, means that our analysis would overstate the 
impact of the program. Of course,   there could be positive spillovers that lead to a bias in the other 
direction, as when participants pass along information they learn in the course of participating to non-  12 
participants, or when participants set an example of employment and activity that inspires non-participants. 
Though potentially important, these effects lie beyond the scope of this paper; we refer the interested reader 
to discussions in, e.g., Davidson and Woodbury (1993), Heckman et al.  (1998b) and Lise et al. (2004). 
 
4.2 Identification using the CIA 
We adopt what Heckman and Robb (1985) call a “selection on observables” identification strategy to 
identify  TT ∆  (which we will call “selection on observed variables”, to emphasize the role of choosing what 
to observe in designing evaluations). This requires that we adopt what the economics literature calls the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) and the statistics literature (rather awkwardly) calls 
“unconfoundedness”. In terms of our notation, we assume that 
  0 | Y DX ⊥ , 
where “⊥” denotes independence and X denotes a set of observed covariates.  In words, we assume 
independence between the untreated outcome and participation in NDLP, conditional on a set of observed 
covariates.  Following Heckman et al. (1998a), we do not assume the conditional independence of the 
treated outcome and participation as we do not need it for the treatment on the treated parameter.  As 
discussed in Heckman and Navarro (2004), we therefore allow for certain forms of selection into the 
program based on impacts.  
  Substantively, this means that we assume that we observe all the variables, or proxies for all of the 
variables, that affect both (not either, but both) participation and outcomes in the absence of participation.  
Conditioning on these variables then removes all systematic differences between the outcomes of 
participants and non-participants other than the effects of participation.  From a different angle, we assume 
that whatever factors determine participation conditional on X are independent of  0 Y .  Thus, conditional on 
X, participation depends on instruments (variables that affect outcomes only via their effect on participation) 
that we do not observe. These unobserved instruments generate variation in treatment status conditional on 
the variables we observe. 
  A long literature suggests the potential for conditioning flexibly on detailed histories of labor market 
outcomes to remove selection bias in the context of evaluating active labor market programs; see e.g. Card 
and Sullivan (1988), Heckman and Smith (1999), Heckman, et al. (1998a), Hotz et al. (2005), Mueser et al. 
(2007) and Heinrich et al. (2009). In addition, the Monte Carlo analysis in Section 8.3 of Heckman et al. 
(1999) shows that conditioning on lagged outcomes substantially reduces bias for a wide variety of 
individual outcome and participation processes. In terms of what determines participation conditional on   13 
observed variables in our context, we expect that it has to do with random differences in information costs 
and other costs of participation that we do not observe, such as distance to the program office.  Finally, 
because we align our lagged outcome measures relative to the start of the participation window (rather than 
the actual start of participation), they should do a better job of eliminating selection bias for lone parents 
starting their spells of NDLP participation early in the window, a prediction we test in Section 6.3.  
 
4.3 Matching algorithm 
We apply both cell matching (sometimes called exact matching) and propensity score matching, as 
developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  They show that if the conditional independence assumption 
holds for X, it also holds for  ( ) Pr( 1| ) PX D X = = , the probability of participation given X, also called the 
propensity score.  Matching on the propensity score, a scalar bounded between zero and one, avoids the 
“curse of dimensionality” inherent in exact matching on multidimensional X.
3
  Propensity score matching constructs an estimated, expected counterfactual for each treated 
observation by taking predicted values from a non-parametric regression of the outcome variable on 
 
() PX
estimated using the untreated observations. Thus, any non-parametric regression method defines a 
propensity score matching method. In our analysis, we use single nearest neighbor matching with 
replacement as implemented in the “psmatch2.ado” program for Stata by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In this 
method, the estimated expected counterfactual for each treated unit consists of the untreated unit with the 
nearest propensity score in absolute value. See, e.g. Smith and Todd (2005a), Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008), Busso et al. (2009a, 2009b) and Huber et al. (2010) for additional discussion of matching and more 
technical detail about alternative matching estimators. 
  Single nearest neighbor matching throws out a lot of potentially useful information by not making use 
of multiple untreated observations near a given treated observation when the data provide them. The Monte 
Carlo analyses by Frölich (2004) and Busso et al. (2009a, 2009b) demonstrate a non-trivial mean squared 
error cost from choosing single nearest neighbor matching rather than alternative methods, such as kernel 
matching, that do use multiple untreated observations. We take a pass on those other methods here due to 
their substantially longer processing time. Constructing weekly impact estimates by stratum, as we do in 
many of our analyses, became infeasible (with the technology available when we performed our empirical 
analyses) unless we relied on single nearest neighbor matching. 
                                                 
3 More accurately, the use of the propensity score pushes the curse of dimensionality back to the estimation of the 
score, where it is overcome by using a (flexible) parametric model.   14 
 
4.4 Matching with stratified samples 
Dolton et al. (2006, pg. 80-83) provide a simple analysis of the application of matching estimators to 
stratified samples.  They show the desirability of exact matching on the variables defining the strata, 
particularly (but not exclusively) in contexts where the mean effect of treatment varies in the subgroups 
defined by the stratification variables.  We adopt this approach in this paper and construct our estimates 
separately for each subgroup defined by the stratification variables (the length of the spell of IS receipt in 
progress and the age of the youngest child at the start of the participation window) unless otherwise noted. 
 
4.5 Implementation details 
We have examined the common support or “overlap” condition at a number of points in the development of 
our analysis and consistently found that, given our large sample size, it represents only a minor issue. As 
such, we do not formally impose the common support condition here; see Smith and Todd (2005b) and Lee 
(2009) for discussions of tests of the common support condition and Crump et al. (2009) and Khan and 
Tamer (2010) for conceptual and technical background. 
    We have performed standard balancing tests on all of our conditioning variables in the context of 
generating estimates using the full sample of administrative data and ignoring the stratification, and we have 
examined the balance of the lagged outcome variables, which we view as the key covariates, for the 
estimates reported here in which we do the matching separately by stratum. Indeed, finding imbalance in 
benefit receipt prior to the start of the participation window when using the specification in the Lessof et al. 
(2003) report started us down the road toward the more flexible conditioning used here; see the discussion in 
Section 4 of Dolton et al. (2006) for more details. As described below we consistently find our preferred 
specification does a good job of balancing the benefit history variables; the sole exception concerns 
outcomes prior to the start of our complete data for the stock. 
  We estimate our standard errors using bootstrapping methods with 200 replications. Our bootstrapping 
operates conditional on the primary sampling units included in the data. As such, we omit any variance 
component operating at the PSU level. If we interpret our estimates as Sample Average Treatment Effects 
(SATE) in the spirit of Imbens (2004), then this problem goes away. A more vexing problem arises from the 
analysis in Abadie and Imbens (2008), who show the inconsistency of the bootstrap for nearest neighbor 
matching. The Monte Carlo analysis in Abadie and Imbens (2006), unfortunately omitted in the published 
version, suggests that while not zero, the inconsistency in the bootstrap may not lead to severely misleading   15 
inferences. We leave the pursuit of the alternative variance estimators in Abadie and Imbens (2011) and 
elsewhere to future work, and in the meantime interpret our standard errors with caution.  
 
5. Impact Estimates 
Table A-1 provides descriptive statistics broken down by participation status, and reveals a surprising 
degree of similarity in the mean observed characteristics of the two groups. Figure 1 presents the unadjusted 
fraction on benefit for NDLP participants and non-participants in our data. It illustrates that, without any 
adjustments and despite their relatively similar characteristics, participants have much lower rates of benefit 
receipt both before and after the start of the participation window. The difference in the period prior to the 
start of the participation window strongly suggests that participants differ from non-participants in ways 
related to benefit receipt other than just NDLP participation. Our analysis seeks to eliminate these 
differences. 
 
5.1 Exact matching on benefit histories 
We begin in the spirit of Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman and Smith (1999) by performing exact 
matching based solely on strings that capture much of the detail in individual histories of benefit receipt.  
This analysis has three primary motivations. First, Dolton et al. (2006) show that the propensity score 
specification employed in Lessof et al. (2003) fails to balance the fractions receiving benefits among 
participants and matched non-participants in the Lessof et al. (2003) sample. This indicates that balancing 
the two groups requires conditioning more flexibly on the benefit history rather than just including the total 
number of days on benefit.
4
                                                 
4 See Appendix C of Phillips et al. (2003) for the details of the National Centre propensity score model. 
 Second, as suggested above, lagged outcomes correlate strongly both with other 
observed determinants of participation and outcomes and with otherwise unobserved determinants such as 
tastes for leisure, particular family obligations such as seriously ill or disabled parents or children and so on. 
Thus, in our view, conditioning on these histories goes a long way toward solving the selection problem. 
Third, this strategy plays to the strength of the administrative data that we employ. Our data are 
comprehensive with respect to information about past histories of benefit receipt, but lack depth in terms of 
other variables, with the exception of basic variables required for program administration such as the 
number and age of children, the age of the lone parent, and the geographic location of the family. In 
particular, our administrative data contain no information on schooling or other qualifications.   16 
  To code up our benefit history strings, we first break the period from June 1999 to September 2000 
(the period over which we have complete data on benefit receipt) into six 11 week “quarters”, where we 
omit the final week just prior to the start of the participation window. We code an indicator variable for each 
quarter for whether or not the individual spent at least half the period on benefit. We then concatenate the 
six indicators to form a string. There are 
6 2 64 = possible strings, ranging (in binary) from 000000 to 
111111.  A string of 111111 indicates someone who spent at least half of all six quarters on benefit; 
similarly, a string of 000000 indicates someone who spent less than half of all six quarters on benefit. 
  The literature suggests two standard alternatives to the strings we employ here: a variable measuring 
the fraction of time on benefit in the pre-program period and a variable measuring the duration of the ISspell 
in progress at the start of the NDLP participation window. Our method has important advantages relative to 
both.  First, relative to a measure of the fraction of time on benefit, the benefit history strings capture the 
timing of benefit receipt. Using the benefit strings, someone with a 33 week spell at the start of the pre-
program period gets coded as 111000, while the same spell at the end of the period gets coded as 000111; a 
variable measuring time on benefit would give the same value to both. Second, relative to using the duration 
of the spell in progress at the start of the participation window, the benefit history strings have the advantage 
of capturing additional spells, if any, during the pre-program period. In addition, our string approach also 
measures the duration of the spell in quarters and indirectly measures the fraction of time out of work in the 
sense of the proportion of 1’s and 0’s. 
  Two important decisions arise in implementing the benefit history strings. The first concerns how 
finely to partition the pre-program period. Each additional sub-period doubles the number of possible 
strings; this in turn consumes degrees of freedom and raises the possibility of common support problems 
due to strings with participants but no non-participants. On the other hand adding additional sub-periods 
increases the plausibility of the CIA. 
  The second, not unrelated, decision concerns the choice of the fraction of time within a period that an 
individual must be on benefit in order to code them as a one for that period. Setting this value high means 
that short spells do not count; for example, if we set the cutoff value at 10 of the 11 weeks, then someone 
with six nine week spells on benefit, one in each 11 week quarter, would be coded as 000000, the same as 
someone who was never on benefit at all. Setting this value low means that short spells count the same as 
continuous participation; for example, if we set the cutoff value at being on benefit just one out of the 11 
weeks, then someone with six one week spells, one in each 11 week quarter, would be coded 111111, the 
same as someone continuously on benefit for all 11 months. We chose the 5.5 week cutoff as a compromise,   17 
keeping in mind that few individuals have more than a couple of spells over the entire pre-program period 
and that the vast majority of spells last at least a couple of months. 
  Our implementation of the strings has one defect, namely the use of a fixed calendar interval relative 
to the participation window rather than using time measured relative to the participation decision.  As a 
result of this choice, for some participants the benefit history strings capture their behavior immediately 
prior to participation, for others they capture behavior a few weeks or months prior to participation.  The 
gain from using fixed calendar dates comes from not having to create phony dates for the non-participants to 
make their participation decision, as in Lechner (1999) and Lessof et al. (2003).  More generally, this 
strategy flows out of our decision, discussed in Section 4.1 above, not to adopt a dynamic treatment effect 
framework. 
  Table 2 presents the results from exact matching on the benefit history strings.  The first five columns 
of the table present the benefit history string for that row, the number of non-participant observations with 
that string, the average of the weekly probability of benefit receipt over the post-program period among non-
participants with that string, the number of participant (treated) observations with that string and the average 
proportion on benefit in the post-program period among participant observations with that string.   
  By far the most common string among both participants and non-participants is 111111; the modal 
benefit history string in both groups represents more or less continuous benefit receipt.  A second set of 
quite common strings, each with several thousand observations in the full sample, consists of strings 
composed of one or more zeros followed by ones.  These almost always represent individuals with a single 
spell of benefit receipt up to the start of the participation window.  A third group of strings with several 
hundred observations each in the full sample consists of strings with ones followed by zeros followed by 
ones (in the case of strings ending in zero the new spell of benefit receipt starts in the omitted week before 
the start of the participation window).  These strings represent interrupted spells. 
  For each string, we construct the string-specific mean impact as the difference in the proportion on 
benefit in the post-program period between the participants and non-participants in the cell. These 
differences appear in the column labeled “TT” in each row. We then calculate the weight for each cell; these 
weights appear in the column labeled “WEIGHT”. As we seek to estimate  TT ∆ , the weight for each string 
consists of the fraction of the participant observations with that string. We then multiply each string-specific 
treatment effect by its weight and put the results in the column labeled “CONTR” (for contribution). 
Summing these yields the overall mean impact estimate for NDLP participation presented in the lower right 
corner of Table 2.   18 
  For the full sample, exact matching on benefit history strings implies that NDLP participation reduces 
the mean proportion of time spent on benefit in the post-program period by 17.61 percentage points. Though 
quite large relative to estimates from similar programs in other countries, it nonetheless lies well below the 
impact estimates reported in Lessof et al. (2003).  We put our estimates in the context of the broader 
literature in Section 7. 
  A comparison of the impact estimates on the full sample with the corresponding estimates for the 
sample with the 111111 individuals removed, which we present in the final two columns of Table 2, shows 




 Less formally, the stock has a larger impact than the flow. This difference has two possible 
sources. It could be that we have simply failed to distinguish strongly enough among the individuals with 
the 111111 history, leading to more selection bias for this group. Under this interpretation, more weight 
should be placed on the impact estimate for the other groups, whom we are able to match more finely on 
their benefit histories. Second, it could be that the NDLP just works better for individuals with very long 
spells on, or mostly on, benefit.   
5.2 Exact matching on sampling stratum 
Motivated by the methodological concerns outlined in Section 4.4, we also present estimates based on exact 
matching only on the sampling strata. As noted in Section 3.1, these strata are defined by the age of the 
youngest child and the length of the IS spell in progress as of the start of the participation window. 
  Figure 2 displays the fraction of time on benefit for participants and for non-participants following 
exact matching on the sampling strata. The underlying matching algorithm corresponds to that in Section 
5.1, but with the strata replacing the benefit history strings. Relative to the raw data shown in Figure 1, exact 
matching by stratum reduces by over half the differences between participants and non-participants in 
benefit receipt rates prior to the participation window. This figure highlights the potential for ignoring the 
stratified sampling issue when constructing matching estimates to lead to substantial bias. 
 
5.3 Propensity score matching 
In this section we present estimates obtained by propensity score matching using the administrative data. In 
light of the importance of exact matching on the sampling strata demonstrated in the preceding section, we 
perform propensity score matching separately within each stratum. That is, within each stratum we estimate 
                                                 
5 This analysis does not take account of the stratified sampling.   19 
a separate propensity score model (though each one contains the same set of covariates) and we match 
participants in a given stratum only to non-participants in the same stratum. 
The propensity score specification for each stratum includes the sex, age (indicators for 10 five-year 
categories) and disability status of the lone parent, the number of children in the household, the age of the 
youngest child, and 12 region dummies (10 for England and one each for Scotland and Wales). In addition, 
we include three sets of variables related to pre-program benefit histories. First, we include 45 indicator 
variables, one for each of the non-empty benefit history strings defined in Section 5.1.
6
Table 3 presents the estimates from the propensity score probit model for the stratum of lone parents 
with IS spells of less than three months duration and youngest children of age less than three years.
  Second, because 
over half of the sample has the same string (111111), and because of concerns that we may not have 
exploited all of the information in the benefit history data for this group, we also add a continuous variable 
that gives the length of any spell of IS receipt in progress as of June 1999. Recall that our data limits what 
we can do in this earlier period. Third, in the spirit of Heckman and Smith (1999), we attempt to capture the 
effects of benefit receipt shortly before the participation decision by including indicator variables for benefit 
receipt in each of the six weeks prior to the start of the participation window.   
7  The 
variables related to the age of the lone parent, the age of their youngest child and the number of children all 
show high levels of statistical and substantive significance. The benefit history variables do not matter 
much, a finding that makes sense for this stratum given their short histories (and given the limited variation 
in spell length within the stratum). Figure 3 presents the fraction on benefit in each month from 1997 
through 2004 for the treated units and matched, via the propensity score matching, untreated units. Two 
patterns stand out: First, the propensity score matching does an impressive job of balancing pre-program 
benefit receipt between the participants and the non-participants.
8
 
 Second, as expected, the propensity score 
matching yields smaller impact estimates than simply matching on the strata, though the impact estimates 




                                                 
6 All strings with fewer than 20 observations were pooled into a single category denoted “222222”.  This 
combination includes 19 strings but only 68 observations. 
7 Results for other strata are available from the authors on request. 
8 The impact estimates corresponding to the figure appear in the first row of Table 6.   20 
6. Further Analyses 
6.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects: stock and flow 
Motivated by our findings in Section 5.1, in this section we present separate propensity score matching 
estimates for the stock (those with benefit history strings of “111111”) and the flow (those with all other 
benefit history strings).  We match exactly on the sample stratum and on whether an individual belongs to 
the stock or the flow. Within subgroups defined by these exact matches, we estimate the propensity score 
model defined in Section 5.3 and use the resulting propensity scores to perform single nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement. 
  Table 4 presents the estimated mean impacts from this analysis at specific points in time in the post-
program period. The first row presents the estimated mean of the weekly impacts on the fraction of time on 
benefit for the entire post-program period. The following four rows present estimates of the difference in the 
fraction on benefit between the participants and the matched non-participants at 3, 9, 24 and 36 months after 
the start of the participation window in August 2000. Three important results emerge from this analysis. 
First, as in the case of exact matching on the benefit strings in Section 5.1, the mean impact differs quite 
substantially between the stock and the flow. For example, the ATT for the full sample over the whole post-
program period equals 19.09 whereas the impacts for the same period for the stock and flow equal 21.04 and 
9.87, respectively. Second, the impacts fall over time for the stock but not the flow. This reduction over time 
results from catch up by the non-participants rather than from increases in benefit receipt among NDLP 
participants; thus, NDLP in part speeds up benefit exits that would otherwise occur several months later on 
their own.   
  With respect to the fade out of program impacts over time, the wider literature does not provide a clear 
guide as to what to expect.  US General Accounting Office (1996) shows that impacts for the US Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) remain quite stable over time; Couch (1992) shows the same for the US 
National Supported Work Demonstration. Dolton and O’Neill (2002) also find a sizeable impact of the 
Restart program in the UK over four years after random assignment. In contrast, Hotz, Imbens and Klerman 
(2006) show that the impacts from the work-first part of the California Greater Avenues to Independence 
(GAIN) program fade out over time.  The impacts of the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project earnings 
supplement program for single parents also fade out due to control group catch up, as shown in 
Michalopoulos et al. (2002).  Among these programs, the services offered by GAIN most closely 
resemblance those offered by the NDLP, though it is a mandatory rather than a voluntary program. 
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6.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects: demographic and benefit history subgroups 
In this section we consider heterogeneity in the mean impact of NDLP among subgroups. First, we estimate 
mean impacts for lone parents with a youngest child in the age intervals [0, 3), [3, 5), [5, 11) and [11, 16] 
years. We then estimate mean impacts for lone parents in IS benefit spell duration intervals of [0, 3), [3, 6), 
[6, 12), [12, 24), [24, 36), and 36 or more months at the start of the participation window. The variables that 
define our univariate subgroups in this section also define, when combined, the sampling strata. The 
estimates come from exact matching on the sample strata, followed by propensity score matching within 
sample stratum using the propensity score model in Section 5.3. We then take weighted averages of the 
estimates from the appropriate strata to obtain the subgroup estimates. 
  Table 5 summarizes the subgroup impact estimates. In Table 5, each row corresponds to the indicated 
subgroup. The column labeled “Treatment” presents the impact estimate for the entire post-program period.  
The column labeled “Pre-window difference” gives the treatment effect for the pre-program period; with 
complete balance of the lagged outcomes this will equal zero. The third column, labeled “Difference” 
subtracts the pre-program difference from the post-program impact estimate. It thus represents an alternative 
impact estimate in the spirit of the symmetric differences estimator in Heckman and Robb (1985). As we do 
a good job of balancing the pre-program benefit histories for most subgroups, we focus our attention on the 
estimates in the “Treatment” column. 
  In terms of the age of the youngest child, we find the smallest point estimates for the youngest children 
and the largest for children ages 3-5, who have recently reached school age. Lone parents of older children 
may find it easier to leave home for work when encouraged to do so by NDLP. Figures 4 and 5 show how 
these impacts play out over time. We find larger but less interpretable differences by the duration of the IS 
spell in progress at the start of the participation window. As expected given the differences between the 
stock and the flow observed in Sections 5.1 and 6.1, lone parents on benefit more than 36 months have the 
largest estimated impacts. Figures 6 and 7 present the impacts for the groups with spells of less than three 
months, and between 2 and 3 years, duration, respectively, and graphically illustrate the exact matching on 
the IS spell length. 
 
6.3 Window width 
Due to the nature of the underlying study design, our benefit history variables all refer to time relative to the 
start of the participation window on August 1, 2000. We can think of these variables as measurement-error  
versions of “latent” benefit history variables measured at the time of the participation decision, where the   22 
amount of measurement error increases as time passes during the participation window. Thinking about the 
variables in this way leads to the conclusion that they should do better at dealing with the selection problem 
for those who participate early in the participation window relative to those who participate later in the 
window. To test this conjecture, in the second panel of Table 6 we present impact estimates that define as 
NDLP participants only those who participate in the first half of the window. 
  Our analysis yields a very important finding: we obtain a lower impact estimate for the first half of the 
window, equal to just 5.21 for the flow. The large change in the estimate relative to that obtained using 
participants over the full window confirms our hypothesis that increasing  measurement error throughout the 
window degrades the quality of the conditioning in the second half of the window. This estimate represents 
our preferred estimate for the flow. We conjecture that reducing the size of the window again would reduce 
the estimated impact still more. For the stock, the estimate also falls in magnitude when we restrict our 
attention to participants in the first half of the window, but the large pre-program difference suggests that we 
should place little weight on the estimates. 
 
6.4 Benefit histories 
The third panel of Table 6 considers several different ways of including benefit history information in the 
propensity scores. Because we already conduct the entire underlying analysis separately for strata defined in 
part by the duration of the spell in progress at the start of the window, even the estimates labeled “no benefit 
history” implicitly condition on benefit duration as described in Table 1. In a linear regression context, this 
roughly corresponds to interacting every regressor with indicators for the six duration categories that define 
the strata; as such, it represents fairly flexible conditioning, particularly for the shorter spells. Thus, the four 
rows in this panel of Table 6 provide information about the marginal value of further conditioning relative to 
that implicit in constructing separate estimates by stratum. 
  In particular, the first row of the panel reports estimates for our preferred specification but omitting the 
benefit history variables. The second specification includes only the fraction of time the individual spent on 
benefit from June 1999 to August 2000. The third specification includes only the duration of the spell in 
progress as of August 2000, the start of the participation window. The final row includes only the benefit 
strings discussed in Section 5.1. 
  The estimates reveal three patterns of interest. First, for the flow, the “no benefit history” and “only the 
duration of the benefit spell” specifications imply substantial (over 2.0) pre-program differences in the 
fraction on benefit. Second, for the stock, all four specifications (along with our preferred specification)   23 
yield pre-program differences of 1.95 or more, with the “duration of the benefit spell” specification leading 
the field. Third, of the two specifications with a small pre-program difference for the flow, the “just the 
benefit strings” specification yields the smaller impact estimate; neither differs by very much from our 
preferred specification estimate. Overall, the additional benefit history variables add surprisingly little to the 
conditioning implicit in constructing separate estimates by strata, though we can reject many of them based 
on unsatisfactorily large pre-program differences.  
 
6.5 Geographic information 
The analyses in the final panel in Table 6 vary the geographic information we condition on while retaining 
the other variables in our preferred specification. In the US context, Heckman et al. 1998a) and Heckman et 
al. (1997a) found conditioning on local labor markets to play a key role in reducing bias in their non-
experimental evaluations of the JTPA program. The findings in Friedlander and Robins (1995) using data 
from various experimental evaluations of US welfare-to-work programs support this conclusion. Similarly, 
Hoynes (2000) finds that local economic conditions matter for the timing of exits of single parents from the 
US Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.  
  In contrast to the literature, we do not find much effect of geography in the NDLP data. To see this, 
compare the penultimate row of the table, which omits all geographic information from the propensity score, 
to our preferred specification in the first row, which includes indicator variables for 11 (of 12) regions 
within the UK. The differences in the estimates are relatively minor for both the stock and flow. The final 
row in Table 7 replaces the 12 region indicators with measures of unemployment and of income and 




 This detailed geographic information hardly moves the estimates at all. We 
remain puzzled by the relative unimportance of geographic conditioning information in the UK  We 
conjecture that this finding has one of two causes: either variation in local labor market conditions and other 
factors gets picked up by the benefit histories or the UK is somehow more homogeneous than the US in 
terms of local labor markets. 
6.6 Attitudinal variables 
In Table 7 we examine the importance of attitudinal variables. To do so, we make use of the postal survey 
administered as part of the official Lessof et al. (2003) evaluation of NDLP. This necessarily limits us to the 
                                                 
9 See Section 5.4 of Dolton et al. (2006) for more on these measures.   24 
subset of 42, 249 lone parents who responded to the postal survey. The postal survey included a battery of 
nine attitudinal statements designed to capture the respondent’s attachment to work.  Respondents gave their 
reaction to each statement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.  
Examples of the statements include “Having almost any job is better than being unemployed” and “It is just 
wrong for a woman with children under five to go out to work”. The last four rows of Table 7 present 
estimates that include one or both of the attitudinal variables and the benefit history variables. As in Table 6, 
because we match within strata defined by the age of the youngest child and the duration of the IA spell, 
even the specifications without our benefit history variables implicitly condition on a coarse measure of IA 
spell duration. 
  Focusing on the flow, we find a large pre-program difference when we do not condition on either the 
benefit history variables or the attitudinal variables in the first row. Conditioning on the benefit histories in 
the second row largely eliminates the pre-program difference but does little to change the impact estimate. A 
comparison of the estimates in this row with those in the first row of Table 6 shows that, given our preferred 
propensity score specification, restricting our attention to the postal survey sample reduces the overall 
impact and the impact on the stock by several percentage points, but has little effect on the impact for the 
flow. This apparent selection on impacts represents one benefit of using administrative data not subject to 
survey non-response. The estimates in the third row of Table 7 leave out the benefit history variables but 
include the attitudinal variables. To our surprise, inclusion of the attitudinal variables produces an estimate 
for the flow of just 5.44.  Similar but less dramatic reductions occur for the stock and overall.  Row 4 
reveals that once we condition on the attitudinal variables, adding in the benefit history variables yields a 
marginally smaller estimate for the flow, while leading to a larger estimate for the stock. 
  In the NDLP data, the attitudinal variables matter a lot, and appear to take care of a substantial amount 
of residual selection on unobserved variables that remains after conditioning on the other variables in our 
preferred specification. Our finding has three implications. First, adding these variables to the administrative 
data, perhaps via a short in-office survey administered at the first meeting with an NDLP caseworker, would 
improve the ability of the administrative data to generate compelling impact estimates. Second, in survey-
based evaluations, adding these variables represents a good use of interview time. Third, the suggestion 
sometimes seen in the literature that attitudinal variables such as the ones we examine here might constitute 
good instruments for participation is clearly inconsistent with their strong relationship with untreated 
outcomes.   
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7. Putting Our Estimates in Context 
7.1 Comparison to the National Centre Evaluation 
The NCSR evaluation presented in Lessof et al. (2003), though examining the same program with (in part) 
the same data and (in part) the same sample, proceeded very differently than we do. Their evaluation 
strategy began with a postal survey sent to everyone in the population described in Section 3.1. This postal 
survey had a response rate of 64.4 percent which, though high by postal survey standards, raised serious 
concerns about non-response bias. Later on, the NCSR administered a face-to-face interview survey to all of 
the NDLP participants who responded to the postal survey whose responses did not come after the start of a 
spell on NDLP, as well as to a matched (using information from the postal survey) sample of NDLP non-
participants. The response rate for the face-to-face interview survey was 70 percent; see Phillips et al. 
(2003), Table 5.5.1. The matching consisted of single nearest neighbor matching without replacement based 
on propensity scores that included demographics, as well as relatively crude measures of lagged outcomes 
from the administrative data and attitudinal variables from the postal survey. Lessof et al. (2003) present 
impacts based on the respondents to the face-to-face interview survey using as their primary outcome 
measure whether or not an individual left IS within nine months of the start of the participation window. 
They estimate a rather startling NDLP impact of 26 percentage points on this outcome. 
  In Dolton et al. (2006), we examine the NCSR evaluation in great detail, and look in particular at 
various features of the design and implementation that might have biased their estimates. Although we do 
not attempt a precise decomposition of the difference between their estimates and our own, we find that 
survey non-response, at least as a function of observed characteristics, does not seem to affect the estimates 
much. The same holds true for the details of the matching method used, which comports with the general 
finding in the literature; see e.g. Smith and Todd (2005a), Mueser et al. (2007), or Plesca and Smith (2007).   
  In contrast, three factors do matter in explaining the difference in estimates. First, flexible conditioning 
on detailed benefit receipt histories leads to lower impact estimates. Second, using all lone parents who 
participate in NDLP during the participation window, rather than just those who participate after returning 
their postal survey, also lowers the impact estimates. Third, using benefit receipt at each point in time, rather 
than just time to the first exit from IS, modestly decreases the estimates by taking account both of 
recidivism onto IS and differential movements to other types of benefits among NDLP participants. Given 
the problems with the Lessof et al. (2003) analysis just described (along with its failure to account for the 
complex sampling scheme as discussed earlier), and detailed at length in Dolton et al. (2006), we strongly 
prefer the estimates presented in this paper.   26 
 
7.2 Comparison to experimental evaluations of US programs 
In this section, we compare our estimates to experimental estimates of employment impacts for similar 
programs serving similar populations in the United States. We focus on the flow estimates in this discussion 
because they have greater policy relevance (you can only treat the stock once), because we have greater 
confidence in them due to our lack of detailed information on benefit receipt before 1999 for the stock, and 
because they correspond better to the population served by US programs. In particular, we highlight the two 
estimates that we find most compelling among all those we present. The first estimate, 5.21, arises from our 
preferred propensity score specification for participants in the first half of the participation window. The 
second, 4.90, comes from our preferred specification augmented with the attitudinal variables and applied to 
the full sample of postal survey respondents. It appears in the last line of Table 7. The first estimate has the 
advantages, described above, of looking only at participants in the first half of the window, and also avoids 
any issues of non-random non-response to the postal survey. The second estimate has the virtue of 
conditioning on the (obviously quite important) attitudinal variables. 
  We look at impact estimates from the US because only the US has accumulated a non-trivial body of 
experimental impact estimates for similar programs administered to similar populations. We focus on 
employment impacts as these correspond most closely to our impacts on benefit receipt, keeping in mind the 
fact that some individuals in the NDLP context may leave benefit but not enter employment. We consider 
two sets of programs: voluntary programs aimed at disadvantaged women and mandatory welfare-to-work 
programs for lone mothers on benefit. In the US context, “on benefit” means in receipt of AFDC or its 
successor Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).   
  We begin by considering two expensive, intensive voluntary programs for populations including but 
not limited to lone mothers: the National Supported Work Demonstration (NSWD) and the Job Corps. If we 
assume that more inputs, in the form of program expense, should generate larger program impacts, then 
these programs provide a (perhaps distant) upper bound on what we might expect from the much less 
intensive treatment provided by NDLP.  The NSWD provided its participants with intensive work 
experience in a supportive environment for several months. Table 4.6 of Hollister and Maynard (1984) 
shows an impact on employment in months 25-27 after random assignment of 7.1 percentage points. The 
Job Corps provides intensive training in job and life skills over several months in a residential setting to 
disadvantaged young adults. Figure VI.8 of Schochet et al. (2001) shows impacts on the fraction of weeks 
employed in the fourth year after random assignment of 0.041 for female participants.   27 
  In our view, the “other services” treatment stream for adult women from the US National Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) may represent the best overall analog to the NDLP among the programs considered 
here. The population served by JTPA included all disadvantaged women, not just lone mothers on benefits, 
but, as shown in Exhibit 4.10 of Bloom et al. (1993), women with some AFDC experience represent 46.1 
percent of the experimental sample for this stream. The “other services” treatment stream, defined based on 
treatments recommended prior to random assignment, includes mainly job search assistance and other low 
intensity services. Exhibit 4.13 of Bloom et al. (1993) presents experimental impact estimates on 
employment rates over the first six quarters after random assignment measured using detailed survey data on 
employment spells.
10
  Gueron and Pauly (1991), LaLonde (1995), Friedlander and Burtless (1995) and Hamilton et al. (2001) 
(and many others) summarize the results from a number of experimental evaluations of mandatory welfare-
to-work programs for AFDC recipients. Table 5-1 in Friedlander and Burtless (1995) presents five year 
employment impacts from experimental evaluations of four mandatory welfare-to-work programs from the 
1980s.  These evaluations measure employment as the number of quarters with non-zero earnings in 
administrative earnings data from state Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems. Under the assumption that 
treatment and control group members work the same fraction of each quarter, we can translate these 
estimates into impacts on employment probabilities. For these four programs, this yields impacts of 0.029 (= 
0.55 / 20), 0.046 (= 0.97 / 21), 0.029 (= 0.41 / 14) and 0.049 (= 0.97 / 20). Table 4.1 of Hamilton et al. 
(2001) presents similar evidence for several welfare-to-work programs implemented in the late 1990s. The 
impacts they report range from -0.1 to 1.6 quarters. Almost all of them lie in the range from 0.3 to 0.8 
quarters. Under the same assumption as before, with a denominator of 20 quarters, 0.8 quarters corresponds 
to an increase in employment probability of about 0.04. 
 The table shows an impact on the probability of employment of 0.045 in the fifth 
quarter after random assignment and 0.023 in the sixth quarter, with an average of 0.043 over all quarters. 
  Like Hämäläinen et al. (2008), we expect mandatory programs to have lower mean impacts than 
voluntary ones due to self-selection on impacts. Thus, the estimates just described represent a lower bound 
on what to expect from the NDLP, with the caveat that some of these programs provide modestly more 
intensive services than the NDLP (though much less intensive than the NSWD or the Job Corps). As such, 
we cannot infer too much from the fact that their impacts fall well below our estimates for the NDLP. 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately, the 30 month impact report in Orr et al. (1996) lacks a similar table and focuses almost entirely 
on earnings rather than employment impacts.   28 
  Taken together, the evidence from the experimental literature in the US suggest that the two estimates 
we highlighted as most compelling for the flow look reasonable. They modestly exceed the estimates for the 
mandatory welfare-to-work programs, as we would expect if individuals who choose to participate in NDLP 
can at least somewhat anticipate their gains from participation. At the same time, they end up below the 
experimental estimates for the more intensive US programs.   
  In the end, we remain concerned that the NDLP impact estimates for the stock seem too large. This 
could have several explanations: first, despite our flexible conditioning on the benefit histories some 
selection on unobserved variables likely remains; our estimates suggest positive selection on unmeasured 
ability or motivation. Second, many benefit leavers may not go into employment. The broader results from 
the US evaluations lead us to doubt the importance of this explanation. Third, the NDLP may have negative 
spillover effects, perhaps due to displacement, on our comparison group; we view this as plausible but 
unlikely to bias the estimates by more than a percentage point or two. Fourth, the UK may do a better job of 
running these programs or they may work better in the UK economic environment. Both of these 
explanations seem unlikely to account for much either, given the strong economy in the US in the time 
period corresponding to most of the evaluations discussed above and given the greater US experience with 
programs of this type. Finally, we note that only the first of these explanations applies more to the stock 
than to the flow.  Given the reasonableness of our flow estimates, we lean toward the first explanation. 
 
8. Conclusions and Interpretations  
Our evaluation of the NDLP using administrative data has yielded a number of  substantive and 
methodological findings. Substantively, we find that the NDLP had an economically meaningful impact on 
the time spent on benefit by participants. The impacts we estimate vary both with participant characteristics 
and over time. We find much larger impacts for lone parents who participate during a long spell of IS 
receipt (“the stock”), which we interpret as the effect of the program at pushing individuals near the margin 
into employment. This represents a one-time windfall for the government and reflects, in our view, the 
historically low rates of employment among lone mothers in the UK, the lack of much effort to push lone 
parents on IS into employment in the past and concurrent policy reforms designed to “make work pay”. Due 
to the limitations of our data, the estimates for the stock also likely contain residual positive selection bias. 
We feel more confident in our modest, but positive and statistically and substantively significant, impacts 
for the “flow”, and argue that these estimates provide a better guide to future policy. We also find that the 
impacts of NDLP fade out modestly over time, as non-participant benefit receipt levels slowly fall. Thus,   29 
some fraction of the effect of NDLP comes from speeding up exits from benefit that would otherwise occur 
a few months later. 
  Methodologically, our analysis has a number of implications for the conduct of future evaluations. 
First, and most importantly, we show the importance of flexible conditioning on pre-program outcomes for 
removing selection bias. Simple summary measures of outcomes, such as the number of months on benefits 
or the length of the spell in progress at the time of participation, though helpful, lose an important part of the 
information contained in the outcome histories. Thus, our findings reinforce the lessons in Card and 
Sullivan (1988) and Heckman and Smith (1999).   
  Second, we find a surprisingly large effect from conditioning on the attitudinal variables measured on 
the postal survey. The use of such variables, which could even be collected routinely at intake and included 
in administrative data, may represent an important avenue for the improvement of non-experimental 
evaluation. Of course, further research on which attitudes to measure and how best to measure them needs to 
complement our own findings. 
  Third, we illustrate the value and importance of taking account of complex sample designs in 
evaluations using matching. We adopt a simple strategy, namely constructing separate estimates by stratum. 
This strategy requires a relatively large sample size per stratum, as in our data, to work well. The natural 
alternative strategy uses weights to take account of the complex sampling design; our strategy here has the 
value of highlighting the importance of the implicit interaction between the IS spell duration and the other 
conditioning variables. 
  Fourth, we show the value of focusing on participants in NDLP who participate early in the 
participation window that defines the treatment, given that we measure our benefit history variables relative 
to the beginning of the window. This conclusion follows from the rising importance of measurement error in 
these variables over time within the window. This finding reinforces the recent focus in the literature on the 
so-called “dynamic treatment effects” framework, that seeks to estimate the impact of participation at a 
particular point in time relative to non-participation at that time, conditional on variables measured up to 
that time.  
  Fifth, contrary to earlier findings using the data from the US JTPA evaluation, we find that 
conditioning on variables related to local labor markets, either at a very detailed level or at a regional level 
within the UK, has little effect on the resulting estimates. This raises some questions about the generality of 
the earlier findings and suggests the value of additional research on when local labor markets matter and 
why.   30 
  Sixth, our analysis highlights the potential for non-experimental evaluations using administrative data 
to produce credible impact estimates. Administrative data allow the flexible conditioning on benefit receipt 
histories that we find important. They also avoid issues of non-random non-response associated with 
survey-based evaluations and generally cost a lot less to produce and use than survey data. We thus 
indirectly highlight the value of producing relatively clean and well-documented administrative data that 
both outside researchers and program staff will find easy to use.   
  Finally, our preferred non-experimental estimates for the “flow” sample coincide well with (the upper 
end of) our priors based on experimental evaluations of similar programs for similar populations in the US. 
Of course, we did not fully specify our analysis plan in advance but instead undertook an iterative reproach 
wherein we refined our analysis over time as we learned more about the data, the evaluation design we 
inherited in part from the NCSR, and the NDLP program itself. This fact reduces but does not eliminate the 
value of our findings as evidence for the proposition that well designed non-experimental evaluations that 
build on the knowledge available in the literature (and have large samples to work with) can produce 
credible estimates that line up with the experimental literature. At the same time, the fact that the NCSR 
evaluation found an impact (on a related dependent variable) several times larger than our own preferred 
impact estimates reinforces the general point that non-experimental impact estimates will likely always have 





   
 
                                                 
11 Though the non-sampling variation in experimental estimates is not zero; see the evidence and discussion in 
Heckman and Smith (2000).   31 
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 Table 1  Sample Composition. 
                           Total Eligible Population  NDLP Participants  Total Sample    









Booster  Total  Wave 
1/2 
Booster  Total  Wave 
1/2 
Booster  Total  Sample 
Rate 
1  [0,3)  [0,3)  1,853  10,139  11,992  119  130  249  1,834  2107  3,941  0.329 
2  [0,3)  [3,6)  6,198  0  6,198  124  0  124  1,814  0  1,814  0.293 
3  [0,3)  [6,12)  11,405  0  11,405  238  0  238  3,503  0  3,503  0.307 
4  [0,3)  [12,24)  17,883  0  17,883  320  0  320  5,354  0  5,354  0.299 
5  [0,3)  [24,36)  11,347  0  11,347  139  0  139  2,869  0  2,869  0.253 
6  [0,3)  [36,∞)  21,122  0  21,122  122  0  122  4,174  0  4,174  0.198 
7  [3,5)  [0,3)  782  3,899  4,681  69  53  122  779  688  1,467  0.313 
8  [3,5)  [3,6)  2,071  0  2,071  161  0  161  2,055  0  2,055  0.992 
9  [3,5)  [6,12)  3,264  0  3,264  93  0  93  1,303  0  1,303  0.399 
10  [3,5)  [12,24)  5,838  0  5,838  115  0  115  1,810  0  1,810  0.31 
11  [3,5)  [24,36)  4,899  0  4,899  106  0  106  1,428  0  1,428  0.291 
12  [3,5)  [36,∞)  22,425  0  22,425  267  0  267  4,568  0  4,568  0.204 
13  [5,11)  [0,3)  1,435  7,401  8,836  134  106  240  1,419  1046  2,465  0.279 
14  [5,11)  [3,6)  3,932  0  3,932  334  0  334  3,885  0  3,885  0.988 
15  [5,11)  [6,12)  5,687  0  5,687  205  0  205  2,825  0  2,825  0.497 
16  [5,11)  [12,24)  9,819  0  9,819  193  0  193  2,981  0  2,981  0.304 
17  [5,11)  [24,36)  7,337  0  7,337  124  0  124  2,213  0  2,213  0.302 
18  [5,11)  [36,∞)  48,290  0  48,290  497  0  497  9,660  0  9,660  0.200 
19  [11,16)  [0,3)  815  4,384  5,199  48  69  117  807  827  1,634  0.314 
20  [11,16)  [3,6)  2,229  0  2,229  55  0  55  646  0  646  0.290 
21  [11,16)  [6,12)  3,189  0  3,189  51  0  51  911  0  911  0.286 
22  [11,16)  [12,24)  5,207  0  5,207  47  0  47  1,027  0  1,027  0.197 
23  [11,16)  [24,36)  3,849  0  3,849  41  0  41  909  0  909  0.236 
24  [11,16)  [36,∞)  29,990  0  29,990  271  0  271  6,027  0  6,027  0.201 
Total        230,866  25,823  256,689  3,873  358  4,231  64,801  5,028  69,829  0.272 
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Table 2. Exact Matching on Benefit History Strings 









































(D)-(B)  (E)x(F)   (E)x(G) 
   (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)  (H)  (I) 
111111  42,408  82.3  2,276  60.1  -22.2  0.54  -11.91  -  - 
000001  4,154  62.2  404  51.3  -10.9  0.1  -1.03  0.21  -2.24 
000000  2,502  66.2  225  47.4  -18.8  0.05  -1  0.11  -2.16 
000011  3,658  65.3  349  55.8  -9.6  0.08  -0.78  0.18  -1.7 
011111  2,598  72.5  196  55.6  -16.9  0.05  -0.78  0.1  -1.69 
000111  2,651  69.1  206  57.1  -12  0.05  -0.58  0.11  -1.26 
001111  2,198  70  165  57.2  -12.8  0.04  -0.5  0.08  -1.08 
100001  367  61.2  41  49  -12.2  0.01  -0.12  0.02  -0.26 
101111  330  76.1  28  58.5  -17.6  0.01  -0.12  0.01  -0.25 
110111  329  79.2  26  64.6  -14.6  0.01  -0.09  0.01  -0.19 
111011  382  73.8  28  60.5  -13.4  0.01  -0.09  0.01  -0.19 
111100  210  71.8  20  54.4  -17.4  0  -0.08  0.01  -0.18 
111101  354  72.6  21  56.3  -16.3  0  -0.08  0.01  -0.17 
110001  328  60.4  21  45.6  -14.9  0  -0.07  0.01  -0.16 
110011  479  68.7  36  61.1  -7.6  0.01  -0.06  0.02  -0.14 
Others  2,646     193           -0.32     -0.54 
Total  65,594     4,235           -17.61     -12.33 
                    Notes: (1) In the spirit of Card and Sullivan (1988), we adopt the following approach.  First, we break 
the period from June 1999 to September 2000 (the period over which we have complete data on benefit 
receipt) into six 11 week “quarters”, where we omit the final week just prior to the start of the 
participation window.  We code an indicator variable for each quarter that indicates whether or not the 
individual spent at least half the period on benefit.  We then concatenate the six different indicators into 
a string.  There are 2
6 = 64 possible strings, ranging from 000000 to 111111.   A string of 111111 
indicates someone who spent at least half of all six quarters on benefit; similarly, a string of 000000 
indicates someone who did not spend at least half of any of the six quarters on benefit. (2) This analysis 
does not take the sample stratification into consideration. 
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Table 3 . Propensity Score Probit Model for Stratum 1 
       Coef/S.E.  Mean  Std Dev 
Disabled  -0.901  0.030  0.171 
  -0.570                 
Length of time disabled  -0.329*  0.157  0.907 
  -0.165                 
On benefit at week 39 in 2000  0.316  0.970  0.171 
 
-0.278                 
On benefit at week 38 in 2000  -0.216  0.936  0.246 
 
-0.218                 
On benefit at week 37 in 2000  0.275  0.883  0.322 
 
-0.190                 
On benefit at week 36 in 2000  -0.034  0.822  0.382 
  -0.159                 
On benefit at week 35 in 2000  0.076  0.740  0.439 
  -0.141                 
On benefit at week 34 in 2000  -0.206  0.641  0.480 
  -0.142                 
Proportion of time on benefit prior to June 1999  -0.217  0.129  0.280 
  -0.176                 
(categorical variables omitted – available upon request)       
Joint significance of categorical variables   Chi-squared statistic / p-
value 
 
Age  13.691                 
  0.057                 
Region  10.787                 
  0.461                 
Age of youngest child  10.071                 
  0.018                 
Number of children   27.731                 
  0.000                 
Benefit history variables  22.186                 
  0.877                 
                      
Observations  3788                 
R-squared  0.061                 
Log-likelihood  -857.023                 
Chi squared statistic  112.207       
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Table 4. Estimated Treatment Effects for the Stock and the Flow 
  Time Period  ATT  Stock  Flow 
All post-programme  19.09  21.04  9.87 
  [0.43]    [0.65]    [0.57]   
       
3 months after start of window  18.2  22.55  8.78 
  [5.29]    [7.65]  [6.73]   
 
      9 months after start of window  22.28  25.93  10.84 
  [1.95]    [2.89]  [2.68] 
 
      24 months after start of window  18.98  20.13  9.99 
  [0.80]    [1.23]    [1.10]   
 
      36 months after start of window  15.83  17.33  8.77 
   [2.61]  [4.11]  [3.17] 
     
       
Notes: (1) Full sample; (2) estimated bootstrap standard errors appear in square brackets 
(3) we define the stock as those individuals who spent more than 50 percent of the weeks 
in each of the six “quarters” prior to the start of the NDLP participation window on 
benefit and we define the flow as the complement of the stock.  In terms of the benefit 
history strings, the stock consists of individuals with a value of 111111 and the flow 
consists of everyone else; (4) the analysis is done separately by stratum; the overall 
estimate consists of a weighted average of the estimates for individual strata. 
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Table 5 Estimating Treatment Effects for Subgroups. 
   
Description  Treatment effect 
Pre-
window 
difference  Difference 
Children at the age of [0,3)  17.2  -0.88  18.08 
  [0.89]    [0.37]    [0.98] 
 
      Children at the age of [3,5)  21.43  1.21  20.22 
  [0.82]    [0.36]    [0.91] 
 
      Children at the age of [5,11)  20.6  0.26  20.33 
  [0.84]    [0.35]    [0.93] 
 
      Children at the age of [11,16)  18.03  1.27  16.76 
  [0.85]    [0.45]    [0.98] 
 
      On IS for less than 3 months  16.6  1.35  15.25 
  [0.83]    [0.58]    [1.03] 
 
      On IS from [3,6) months  11.73  -2.27  14.01 
  [0.94]    [0.61]    [1.13] 
 
      On IS from [6,12) months  18.12  1.33  16.78 
  [0.87]    [0.60]    [1.07] 
 
      On IS from [12,24) months  15.84  0.96  14.87 
  [0.96]    [0.54]    [1.12] 
 
      On IS from [24,36) months  20.3  0.22  20.09 
  [0.92]    [0.47]    [1.05] 
 
      On IS for more than 36 months  24.93  0.82  24.11 
   [1.07]    [0.24]    [1.12] 
       
Notes: (1) Estimated bootstrap standard errors appear in square brackets; (2) the impact 
estimates refer to the entire post-programme period; (3) the subgroups are define 
according to the administrative database used to draw the initial National Centre sample; 
(4) the age of the children refers to the youngest child in the household as of August 2000; 
(5) the analysis is done separately by stratum; the overall estimate consists of a weighted 
average of the estimates for individual strata. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analyses: Window Width, Benefit History Variables and Local 
Labour Market Variables 














Our preferred specification                   
Our preferred specification  19.09  0.46  9.87  0.49  21.04  1.97 
 
[0.43]    [0.19]    [0.57]    [0.17]    [0.65]    [0.45]   
Alternative Group of Participants                   
Our preferred speciation with participants 
from the first half of the window   
14.74  1.24  5.21  0.06  17.48  6.23 
[0.90]    [0.44]    [0.82]    [0.28]    [1.00]    [0.63]   
              Alternative Benefit History Specifications                
No benefit history variables  18.19  2.52  10.02  2.05  19.78  2.16 
 
[0.45]    [0.23]    [0.58]    [0.25]    [0.64]    [0.49]   
              Only the fraction of time on benefit from 
June 1999 to August 2000  18.23  1.22  9.36  0.98  19.06  1.95 
 
[0.44]    [0.21]    [0.55]    [0.20]    [0.66]    [0.49]   
              Only the duration of the benefit spell in 
progress at the start of the window  18.53  2.17  10.93  2.53  20.37  3.66 
 
[0.43]    [0.22]    [0.58]    [0.29]    [0.64]    [0.51]   
              Just the benefit history strings  17.79  0.85  8.11  0.22  19.79  2.37 
 
[0.43]    [0.21]    [0.55]    [0.19]    [0.64]    [0.47]   
Alternative Geographical Specifications                   
No geographic information  20.11  -0.37  10.66  -0.68  21.91  2.12 
 
[0.52]    [0.16]    [0.58]    [0.16]    [0.68]    [0.43]   
              Detailed local council area variables  20.38  0.75  9.6  -0.42  20.5  1.28 
   [0.40]    [0.20]    [0.54]    [0.17]    [0.61]    [0.47]   
              Notes: (1) Estimated bootstrap standard errors appear in square brackets; (2) the impact 
estimates refer to the entire post-programme period; (3) the analysis is done separately by 
stratum; the overall estimate consists of a weighted average of the estimates for individual 
strata. 
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Table 7. Attitudinal Variables  
        Description  Sample  Full     Flow  Stock 
Preferred Model     Treatment 
Pre-
Diff  Treatment 
Pre-
Diff  Treatment 
Pre-
Diff 
   
 
 
        No attitudinal variables 
and no benefit history 
information 
Postal Survey 
Respondents   21.37  3.29  9.27  2.12  25.06  4.21 
[0.50]    [0.27]    [0.75]    [0.22]    [0.75]    [0.61]   
   
 
 
        No attitudinal variables 
but including benefit 
history information 
Postal Survey 
Respondents   20.18  0.93  9.58  0.08  24.84  0.34 
[0.49]    [0.22]    [0.74]    [0.23]    [0.79]    [0.57]   
   
 
 
        Attitudinal variables 
included but no benefit 
history information. 
Postal Survey 
Respondents   17.8  1.3  5.44   0.80   13.01  -2.08 
[0.65]    [0.35]    [0.59]  [0.29]  [0.98]    [0.84]   
   
            Includes attitudinal 
variables and benefit 
history information. 
Postal Survey 
Respondents    17.53  0.31  4.9  0.41  17.6  2.44 
[0.63]    [0.33]    [0.57]    [0.26]    [0.99]    [0.87]   
                Notes: (1) Estimated bootstrap standard errors appear in square brackets; (2) the impact 
estimates refer to the entire post-program period; (3) the analysis is done separately by stratum 
and the overall estimate consists of a weighted average of the estimates for the individual strata; 
and (4) the postal survey sample includes 42,249 observations. 
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Table A-1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Included in the Propensity Score Model       
Description 
Participants  Non-participants 
Sex = male                         0.06                          0.06  
Age (category) = 20 - 24                         0.16                          0.15  
Age (category) = 25 - 29                         0.21                          0.20  
Age (category) = 30 - 34                         0.23                          0.23  
Age (category) = 35 - 39                         0.19                          0.19  
Age (category) = 40 - 44                         0.10                          0.11  
Age (category) = 45 - 49                         0.04                          0.05  
Age (category) = 50 - 54                         0.01                          0.02  
Region =  north west                                     0.16                          0.15  
Region =  merseyside                                     0.06                          0.05  
Region =  yorkshire & humber                             0.05                          0.05  
Region =  east midlands                                  0.07                          0.07  
Region =  west midlands                                  0.06                          0.08  
Region =  south west                                     0.08                          0.06  
Region =  eastern                                        0.04                          0.04  
Region =  london                                         0.14                          0.17  
Region =  south east                                     0.10                          0.10  
Region =  wales                                          0.08                          0.07  
Region =  scotland                                       0.11                          0.12  
Age of the youngest child (category)== 2 yrs                         0.08                          0.08  
Age of the youngest child (category)= 3 to 5 yrs                         0.28                          0.23  
Age of the youngest child (category)= 6 to 7 yrs                         0.12                          0.12  
Age of the youngest child (category)= 8 to 11 yrs                         0.20                          0.18  
Age of the youngest child (category)= 12 to 19 yrs                         0.11                          0.13  
Number of children (category) = 2                         0.34                          0.33  
Number of children (category) = 3                         0.11                          0.15  
Number of children (category) = 4 to 8                         0.04                          0.07  
Benefit history = 000001                         0.03                          0.09  
Benefit history = 000010                         0.13                          0.47  
Benefit history = 000011                         0.10                          0.06  
Benefit history = 000101                         0.08                          0.06  
Benefit history = 001001                         0.05                          0.04  
Benefit history = 010001                         0.04                          0.03  
Benefit history = 100001                         0.05                          0.04  
Benefit history = 100101                         0.01                             -    
Benefit history = 110001                         0.01                             -    
Benefit history = 110111                         0.01                          0.01  
Benefit history = 111000                         0.01                          0.01  
Benefit history = 111101                         0.01                             -    
Benefit history = 111110                         0.01                             -      8 
Benefit history = 111111                         0.01                          0.01  
Disabled lone parent                         0.55                          0.66  
On benefit in week prior to benefit window                         0.99                          0.98  
On benefit in week two weeks prior to benefit window                         0.99                          0.98  
On benefit in week three weeks prior to the benefit window                         0.98                          0.98  
On benefit in week four weeks prior to the benefit window                         0.97                          0.97  
On benefit in week five weeks prior to the benefit window                         0.96                          0.96  
On benefit in week six weeks prior to the benefit window                         0.94                          0.95  
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Figure 1 Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Unadjusted 
 
Notes: DATE1 is the data at which complete benefit history data become available. DATE2 
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Figure 2 Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Matching on Strata 
 
 
Notes: DATE1 is the data at which complete benefit history data become available. DATE2 
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Figure 3 Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Propensity Score Matching 
 
Notes: DATE2 and DATE3 define the participation window. The estimates in the figure 
represent a weighted (by the fraction of treated units in the stratum) average of separate 
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Figure 4. Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Propensity Score Matching 
Youngest Child Age 0-3. 
 
 
Notes: DATE2 and DATE3 define the participation window. The estimates in the figure 
represent a weighted (by the fraction of treated units in the stratum) average of separate 
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Figure 5. Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Propensity Score Matching 
Youngest Child Age 11-16. 
 
 
Notes: DATE2 and DATE3 define the participation window. The estimates in the figure 
represent a weighted (by the fraction of treated units in the stratum) average of separate 
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Figure 6 Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Propensity Score Matching 
On IS for Less Than 3 Months. 
 
 
Notes: DATE2 and DATE3 define the participation window. The estimates in the figure 
represent a weighted (by the fraction of treated units in the stratum) average of separate 
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Figure 7 Benefit Receipt by Participation Status: Propensity Score Matching 
On IS for 2 to 3 years. 
 
 
Notes: DATE2 and DATE3 define the participation window. The estimates in the figure 
represent a weighted (by the fraction of treated units in the stratum) average of separate 
propensity score matching estimates obtained for each stratum in this subgroup. 